![]() Every order is the expression of a particular structure of power relations and it is always established through the exclusion of other possibilities, hence its political character. This perspective reveals that every order results from the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices. In this view, the social is constituted by sedimented hegemonic practices that is, practices that appear to proceed from a natural order, concealing the originary acts of their contingent political institution. It is precisely this dimension to which the category of hegemony refers, as it indicates that every society is the product of practices that seek to institute an order in a context of contingency. To assert the ineradicability of antagonism requires acknowledging the impossibility of reaching a final ground, and instead recognizing the dimension of undecidability and of contingence that pervades every order. 1 The concept of antagonism is central because it postulates the existence of a radical negativity that impedes the totalization of society and forecloses the possibility of society beyond division and power. This approach has been first elaborated in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, written with Ernesto Laclau, in which we argued that two fundamental concepts are needed to elaborate a theory of the political: antagonism and hegemony. To understand what I mean by ‘passions’ and how I see their role in politics requires acquaintance with the theoretical framework that informs my approach. Photo Source: Flickr Antagonism and hegemony Victory of Alexis Tsipras (SYRIZA) during Greek legislative elections in 2015. After presenting the main tenets of my theoretical approach, I will show how this approach is particularly suited to grasping the nature of the populist moment that characterizes our present conjuncture and of how to answer the challenge that it represents. ![]() I contend that, without understanding the crucial role played by common affects in the constitution of political forms of identification, it is not possible to envisage what is at stake in democratic politics. To be sure, ‘passions’ can also be of an individual nature, but I have chosen to use that term, with its more violent connotations, because it allows me to underline the dimension of conflict and to suggest a confrontation between collective political identities, two aspects that I take to be constitutive of politics. ![]() It is with regard to the political domain that my approach has been elaborated one of its central tenets is that, in that field, we are always dealing with collective identities – something that the term ‘emotions’ does not adequately convey because emotions are usually attached to individuals. This is why I want to stress that, from the perspective that I advocate, it is essential to distinguish between ‘passions’ and ‘emotions’. ![]() In fact, I have often been asked why I speak of passions instead of emotions. I have for a long time in my work put a special emphasis on the role of ‘passions’ in politics, and I would like here to clarify what I understand by ‘passions’ and how I see their role in politics. Some of them are influenced by Deleuze and Guattari, others by the neurosciences, others by a variety of constructivist schools. They disagree on the very meaning of the terms ‘affects’ and ‘emotions’, not to speak of their relation. It designates a very heterogeneous body of works among which it is not easy to find ‘family resemblances’, because the theorists who are sometimes put under this umbrella come from a variety of approaches that are difficult to reconcile. Emotions and affects have recently become a fashionable topic among philosophers and people working in social sciences and the humanities and there is a growing literature on what has been called the ‘affective turn’.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |